Séminaire Algo  Marie van den Bogaard
3nov.2020 14:00
Il y a: 78 days
Marie van den Bogaard
Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games
Zoom (if you want to participate, please request the meeting password. If your interest in the seminar is more general, you can request to be added to the announcement mailing list which will contain the password for each meeting) In this talk, we consider multiplayer games on graphs. In such games, each player has his own objective, that does not necessarily clash with the objectives of the other players. In this “non zerosum” context, equilibria are a better suited solution concept than the classical winning strategy notion. We will focus on a refinement of the wellknown Nash Equilibrium concept: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE for short), where players have to play rationnally in every scenario, even the ones that deviate from the planned outcome. We will explain why this refinement is a relevant solution concept in multiplayer games and show how to handle them in quantitative reachability games, where each player wants to minimize the number of steps to reach its own target set of vertices. 
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